This paper analyzes the implications of pre-trade transpareny on market performance. We …nd that transparency increases the precision held by agents, however we show that this increase in precision may not be due to prices themselves. In competitive markets, transparency increases market liquidity and reduces price volatility, whereas these results may not hold under imperfect competition. More importantly, market depth and volatility might be positively related with proper priors. Moreover, we study the incentives for liquidity traders to engage in sunshine trading. We obtain that the choice of sunshine/dark trading for a noise trader is independent of his order size, being the traders with higher liquidity needs more interested in sunshine trading, as long as this practice is desirable.
Introduction
One of the most surprising phenomena in the microstructure of …nancial markets is the heterogeneity in pre-trade transparency exhibited by di¤erent trading venues. 1 Although one could argue that most of the modern stock trading platforms distribute information on depth, accessible to traders either by subscribing
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y Corresponding author: Carolina Manzano Tovar. Address: Department of Economics and CREIP, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Av. de la Universitat 1, Reus 43204, Spain. E-mail: carolina.manzano@urv.cat. 1 Pre-trade transparency refers to the wide dissemination of price quotations and orders before trade takes place. 1 directly to the market feed, or by purchasing a consolidated feed, it is also true that in the last ten years there has been a tendency to introduce anonymity into stock, bond, and foreign exchange markets. 2 Similarly, we are nowadays envisioning the evolution to dark trading in exchange markets. 3 An investigation on dark trading can be found in Bloom…eld et al. (2011) . They compare visible markets in which all orders must be displayed, Iceberg (or reserve) markets that allow both displayed and partially displayed orders, and Hidden markets in which orders can be non-displayed. 4 There is broad agreement that transparency matters; it a¤ects the informativeness of the order ‡ow and, hence, the process of price discovery, but the key e¤ects of transparency on security markets are complex and contradictory. As pointed out by Eom et al. (2007) "...there is no consensus on whether an increase in pre-trade transparency results in an improvement or deterioration in market quality." These authors study changes in pre-trade transparency in the Korea Exchange. They conclude that market quality is increasing in pre-trade transparency. In the same line Boehmer et al. (2005) …nd that the introduction of OpenBook by the NYSE leads to a more active management of trading strategies and improvements in terms of liquidity and informational e¢ ciency. These results contrast with …ndings derived in Madhavan et al. (2005) . This paper shows that an increase in pre-trade transparency in the Toronto Stock Exchange leads to wider spreads, lower depth, and higher volatility. This is consistent with the empirical evidence from the French Stock Exchange where liquidity increased after anonymity was introduced (see Foucault et al. (2007) ), the same occurred when brokers identi…cation codes were removed at The Tokyo Stock Exchange (see Comerton-Forde et al. (2005) ). Similarly, the experiments by Bloom…eld et al. (2011) support the robustness of informational e¢ ciency and liquidity in opaque regimes too.
In this article we are concerned with pre-trade transparency in the form of disclosing information about the composition of the order ‡ow to market participants. Depending of who takes the disclosure decision, two types of pretrade transparency can be distinguished: mandatory/prohibited and voluntary. In the former the decision whether to reveal (or not to reveal) information about the composition of the order ‡ow is taken by the exchange. In the later, the investors voluntarily decide whether to reveal the orders.
One of the studies focused on the implications of the …rst type of pre-trade transparency is Madhavan (1996) . He compares two trading mechanisms, called opaque and transparent. In the opaque market the exchange does not reveal 2 Anonymity was introduced into the French Stock Exchange in 2001 and into the Italian one in 2004. See Rindi (2008) for a comparison of anonymous versus pre-trade transparent regimes. 3 Dark pools are trading systems where there is no pre-trade transparency of orders in the system. They can be split into two types: systems such as crossing networks in which cross orders are not subject to pre-trade transparency requirements, and trading venues, such as regulated markets and MTFs, that use waivers for avoiding to display orders. By contrast, lit markets are pre-trade transparent. 4 Other issues related to pre-trade transparency are the comparison of ‡oor versus automated trading systems and the logic for trading halts, among others.
any information about the composition of the order ‡ow, whereas in the transparent market the exchange reveals the price insensitive component that comes from traders who have liquidity needs. He shows that there exists an inverse relationship between price volatility and market depth; for some parameter con…gurations an increase in transparency delivers the desirable properties of higher liquidity and lower price volatility, whereas for others it can exacerbate volatility and decrease liquidity. These results are derived under the proviso that rational investors hold improper or non-informative priors about the liquidation value of the risky asset. 5 We here propose to frame Madhavan's analysis in a more canonical way. We assume that rational investors are endowed with proper priors. The assumption of proper priors is more realistic to us, as in …nancial markets traders negotiate regularly and, therefore, ex-ante they are not completely ignorant about the liquidation value of the assets they trade.
We show that in competitive markets, transparency increases market liquidity and reduces price volatility, whereas under imperfect competition the implications of market transparency are ambiguous. More importantly, the inverse relationship between price volatility and market liquidity, obtained in competitive markets or when investors have improper priors, may not hold with imperfect competition and proper priors, i.e., the inverse relationship between market depth and price volatility reported in Madhavan (1996) may not hold if investors have proper priors. 6 If market depth and volatility are negatively related, an increase in transparency either stabilizes prices and increases market liquidity (both of them suitable properties of a …nancial market) or increases volatility and reduces liquidity (both of them undesirable for a market). Since preferences for both of these market indicators are aligned, one could conclude that transparency is unambiguously a good or a bad property for a market to have. However, if such a (negative) relation does not hold then there are tradeo¤s among these two market indicators, and a clear ranking between transparent and opaque markets may not exist.
Additionally, we …nd that transparency increases the precision of traders' predictions about the liquidation value. However, the comparison on market liquidity across market structures does also depend on prior speci…cation as with proper priors the opaque market is deeper for a larger parameter speci…cation set.
This paper also addresses the issue of voluntary disclosure of the orders, prior to trading, of some liquidity traders to the other participants, a practice known as sunshine trading. We study the incentives for liquidity traders to engage in sunshine trading. We obtain that the choice of sunshine/dark trading for a noise trader is independent of his order size. Moreover, as long as sunshine 5 Bayesians believe only in proper priors as a foundation for statistics. For a discussion on the relationship between proper and improper prior distributions, see O'Hagan (1994). 6 Although we lack of a clear-cut intuition for the need of uninformative priors to deliver Madhavan's results, we believe that the arguments behind them are along the following lines. The use of improper priors is equivalent to the use of no prior information. By contrast, informative priors convey information on what are the relevant values of the parameters when it comes to study the properties that a given model satis…es.
trading is desirable, the traders with higher liquidity …nd more pro…table this practice.
Sunshine trading has also been analyzed by Admati and P ‡eiderer (1991). 7 They …nd that the identi…cation of liquidity orders reduces the trading costs of those who preannounce, but its e¤ects on the trading costs and welfare of other traders are ambiguous. They also show that sunshine trading increases the informativeness of the price whereas it reduces the variance of the price change. Admati and P ‡eiderer consider a continuum of informed agents, who are price-takers and their motive for trading is information. We here consider a …nite number of informed traders, who behave strategically and their motive for trading is information and hedging. Thus, our results assess the impact of relaxing the assumption of a continuum of informed agents in their conclusions.
Another di¤erence between Admati and P ‡eiderer's paper and ours is that we endogenize the choice of the preannouncement. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the notation and the hypotheses of the model. Section 3 characterizes the unique symmetric linear equilibrium in a general framework. Section 4 examines the implications of transparency when the disclosure decision is taken by the exchange and Section 5 deals with the choice of sunshine/dark trading by individuals. Section 6 provides some concluding comments. Finally, proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
The Model
We consider a pure exchange economy where at time 0 a risky asset is traded in an auction market against a riskless bond, whose return is normalized to zero. The liquidation value of the risky asset in period 1 is represented by the random variable e v. We assume that e v is normally distributed with …nite mean v and variance
8 The risky asset is traded at the automatic market-clearing price p, so that its return is given by its liquidation value minus the price.
In this economy there are N strategic traders indexed by n who are endowed with assets and are privately informed about the liquidation value of the risky asset. Trader n holds an initial endowment of y n shares of the riskless asset and an initial endowment of ! n shares of the risky asset. Traders have CARA preferences over …nal wealth of the form U ( f W n ) = expf f W n g; where > 0 denotes the common coe¢ cient of risk aversion and f W n represents the …nal 7 Dia and Pouget (2011) …nds evidence of sunshine trading in the West-African Bourse. 8 As in most models of market microstructure (see for instance, Hellwig (1980) , Diamond and Verrechia (1981) , Glosten and Milgrom (1985) , Kyle (1985 Kyle ( , 1989 , Huddart et al. (2001) , among others) we suppose that priors are proper. By doing so, we are able to determine how the strength of prior information a¤ects the robustness of the results on market metrics provided by Madhavan (1996) . Moreover, we will try to recover his results, whenever possible, by taking a large variance of e v: The use of limits to recover the results under improper priors is standard. See, for instance, Morris and Shin (2003) in the context of global games. 4 wealth for the n-th investor, which is given by f W n = (e v p) q n + e v! n + y n ;
where q n denotes the units of the risky asset traded by investor n: 9 Thus, traders are risk averse and they choose their desired order quantities to hedge their risk exposures. But portfolio hedging is not their sole motive for trade, as strategic traders posses private information. Before trading takes place, each strategic trader receives a private signal conveying information about the liquidation value of the risky asset. Lets n = v + e " n denote the private signal of the n-th trader, where v is the realized value of the risky asset and e " n is a random variable which represents the private signal error for the n-th investor. 10 Traders use their information to speculate in the market so that part of trade is informationmotivated with transaction volume arising endogenously. In addition to the demands of the speculative traders, there is another component of order ‡ow, denoted byz; which represents the imbalances arising from uninformed or noisy traders whose demands are price inelastic. We assume thatz is independent of the remainder random variables of the model.
Informed traders submit their (net) demand functions to a unique auctioneer, who aggregates all the demand schedules and the noisy demand and calculates the price at which the market clears. At this price, the auctioneer allocates quantities to satisfy traders'demands.
We end the model assuming that all the random variables e " 1 ; :::; e " N ;! 1 ; ::: ;! N are uncorrelated with e v, and normally and independently distributed with a mean normalized to zero and a variance equal to
11 Finally, their joint distribution is assumed common knowledge.
In this set-up, we will analyze several trading mechanisms that di¤er in their degree of transparency regarding the random imbalance of uninformed liquidity traders. The …rst mechanism is opaque in that rational traders do not receive any information about the composition of the order ‡ow. In this framework, we assume thatz is normally distributed with a mean normalized to zero and a variance equal to 2 z . The second one is transparent so that the realization ofz is disclosed to all market participants prior to trading. In this setup the expected value ofz is the realization of this random variable, z; and its variance is null. Finally, we examine a trading mechanism with the possibility of sunshine trading, i.e., a framework where some liquidity traders voluntarily preannounce the size of their orders.
The Symmetric Linear Equilibrium in a General Framework
In order to compute the optimal demand schedules in the aforementioned trading protocols, we de…ne and characterize a symmetric linear equilibrium in a more general framework, assuming that the expected value of the noise demand, denoted by z; may be not null. Then, giving values to the expected value and the variance of the noise demand, we will obtain the characterizations of the symmetric linear equilibria for the di¤erent trading mechanisms. For instance, in the opaque market z = 0 and 2 z > 0; whereas in the transparent market z = z and
12 Let q n ( ; I n ) denote the net demand schedule of informed trader n, given that he has observed the information set I n ; where I n = (s n ; ! n ; y n ); i.e., I n contains the private signals observed by trader n: Thus, q n = q n (p; I n ) will represent the net quantity demanded by the n-th informed investor, for particular realizations of both the price of the risky asset e p and the vector which collects his information e I n :
In this economy, we will search for a rational expectations equilibrium under imperfect competition (REE, for short) in which traders follow identical linear demand functions. A REE de…nes a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in demand functions. In words, it is a price and a set of demand schedules such that the market clears and each trader n; given his information set, submits demand orders which maximize his conditional expected utility taking into account the e¤ect of his trading on prices and taking as given the strategies of other traders. We next de…ne it formally.
De…nition 1: A rational expectations equilibrium is a price p and a vector of strategies q = (q 1 ; ; q N ) ; such that: i) Excess demand is zero at the equilibrium price
ii) Each trader n maximizes the expected utility of …nal period wealth given the strategies of other traders,
v! n + y n ]j p; I n ) ; for n = 1; :::; N:
As mentioned above, for the tractability of the analysis, we will focus on symmetric linear rational expectations equilibrium (SLE, for short).
De…nition 2: A symmetric linear equilibrium is a rational expectations equilibrium in which traders' net demand functions are identical linear functions, that is,
where ; ; and are constants.
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Following Kyle (1989) , in a SLE the optimal demand function for trader n is given by q n (p; I n ) = E(e vjp; I n ) p var(e vjp; I n )! n 1 (N 1) + var(e vjp; I n )
This demand maximizes traders'utility whenever the second order condition for a maximum holds, or, equivalently, if the inequality below is satis…ed
To study the existence of a SLE, we …rst write all coe¢ cients of speculators' demands as functions of the coe¢ cient : This coe¢ cient is then characterized as a root of a polynomial. If such a root exists, then one might conclude that a SLE exists. These facts are formally stated in the following results:
; and (5) 
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We end this subsection providing a su¢ cient condition for the existence and uniqueness of a SLE. This result shows the existence and uniqueness of the SLE under general conditions. When 2 z 6 = 0; we only require that N 3 as in Kyle (1989) . 16 As in his model, if there are only two rational investors and the noise demand is in…nitely inelastic, these speculators have "too much" power and they would like to trade a boundless quantity. In addition, Proposition 1 indicates that when 2 z = 0 a SLE may fail to exist as existence requires that the liquidity shock via endowments is large enough. The rationale for this inequality is as follows. Whenever the price is not a good estimator of the private information (because either 2 ! or 2 " are high), or, alternatively, agents face a high inventory cost from maintaining their initial holdings of the risky asset (the coe¢ cient of risk aversion is high), then they …nd pro…table to participate in the market as will be large enough. But if traders are well informed and/or there is little endogenous liquidity needs (
and are low so that is also low), then agents are unwilling to reveal their information to others as they …nd the readjustment of their portfolio very expensive. They prefer to consume their initial endowment and this results in a market breakdown. When this is the case, a SLE fails to exist.
Transparency and its Implications
In this section we will analyze and compare the opaque mechanism and the transparent mechanism. Recall that in the …rst one rational traders do not receive any information about the composition of the order ‡ow, whereas in the second one the realization of the noise demand is disclosed to all market participants prior to trading. In what follows, we will use superscripts O and T to refer to the opaque and the transparent markets, respectively.
Recall that in the opaque market z = 0 and 
where O is the unique real root belonging to 0;
of the polynomial of degree three Q( ).
Corollary 2: A SLE in a transparent market exists i¤ N < (N 2) : If it exists, then
Using the expression of T ; it follows that the coe¢ cient associated with z, i.e., 
Transparency and Equilibrium Comparison
Next, we discuss the impact of transparency on the strategic behavior of investors, as it in ‡uences not only existence of equilibrium, but also the price intercept and the slope of traders'demands.
Regarding existence of equilibrium, note that if a SLE exists for the transparent market, it exists for the opaque market as well. The condition for existence in the former, N < (N 2) ; must meet N > 2 but, as N is a natural number, then it requires N 3. Note that this is the condition for existence in the latter. Thus, trading is more robust in the opaque market than in the transparent market. In other words, transparency may induce a form of market failure. 17 Moreover, it is important to point out that the conditions for existence of SLE are the same as the ones derived by Madhavan (1996) . This result is not surprising given that under non-informative priors, the existence conditions are independent of 2 v : As for the shape of the demand functions, transparency has two main effects. An increment in the price of the risky asset makes agents more optimistic about its liquidation value, which leads to a smaller reduction in the individual demands as compared to the opaque market. Second, demands become less sensitive to traders'liquidity shocks and private signals. The rationale is that in the transparent market, there is a higher need for camou ‡age which makes demands less sensitive to private information. The next corollary summarizes these results. Corollary 3: Traders' demands are less sensitive to both private information and price in a transparent market as
In sum, transparency reduces endogenous liquidity trading creating less risk sharing ( T < O ), makes orders less responsive to private information about the liquidation value ( T < O ) and reduces demands' price-responsiveness T < O :
Transparency and Market Quality
In this subsection we examine the economic implications of pre-trade transparency. Speci…cally, we analyze the di¤erences between the opaque and the transparent market in terms of some measures of market quality.
Informational E¢ ciency
The market microstructure literature provides several sensible measures of the informational e¢ ciency of a market. 18 One is the precision of the information held by informed traders, measured by var 1 (e vjp; I n ). Another one is the informational content of the equilibrium price, which captures the information revealed by prices to uninformed traders, measured by var 1 (e vjp).
Proposition 2: At the time the trade is made and z is realized, pre-trade transparency unambiguously increases the precision of the information held by informed traders.
In the transparent market the information held by agents is more precise than in the opaque market. Next, we show that prices by themselves may not contribute to this greater precision as in equilibrium var 1 (e vjp O ) migth be larger than var 1 e vjp T .
Proposition 3: i) Prices are more informative in the transparent market i¤ the following inequality holds
is low enough, then prices are always more informative in the transparent market.
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Notice that from the expressions of the market clearing price, given bỹ
O N j=1!j +z and (7) is small when is large. The second e¤ect, despite being small as well, becomes the dominant one.
Market Liquidity
In order to measure the impact of transparency on market liquidity, we now compare the market depth in the two market structures. Following Kyle (1985) , the market depth is de…ned as the quantity of noise trading required to induce the price of the risky asset to boost by one unit. Formally, market depth is given by @p
From Equation (2) and the market clearing condition, it follows that
where fM =Og is an indicator function that takes value one if M = O and zero if M = T: Thus, noise trading a¤ects market price through three channels captured by the three terms in equation above: an adverse-selection e¤ect, a strategic e¤ect and a risk-bearing e¤ect. The adverse-selection e¤ ect is captured by the …rst term via h M n . An increase in z increases h O n without a¤ecting h T n (in the transparent market this e¤ect is absent as noise demand is displayed). Speculator n assumes that an increment might be due to his competitors receiving favorable signals about the payo¤ of the risky asset. Each speculator therefore adjusts his forecast upwards which generates a price boost. The strategic e¤ ect, the second term z=(N 1)N M ; measures the competitiveness of the market or its size via N; as well as the price sensitivity of strategic traders' demands. As they are less price-sensitive in the transparent market, this second e¤ect is stronger in the transparent market. 20 Finally, there is a risk-bearing e¤ ect. The market-clearing price must accommodate for inducing risk-averse speculators to trade. As speculators are better informed in the transparent market, this third e¤ect is more important in the opaque market. Whenever N converges to in…nity the strategic-behavior e¤ect vanishes. The equilibrium price is unambiguoisly more sensitive to changes in the noise demand in the opaque market. The transparent market is deeper. This result may no longer hold under imperfect competition. Two su¢ cient conditions for obtaining a larger market depth in a transparent market are given below.
or, alternatively, if O is close to T ; making O T very small, so that transparency increases market depth. Regarding the su¢ cient condition in (9) its intuition is less clear. When N converges to in…nity it simpli…es to 1 < . This inequality coincides with the condition that guarantees the existence of the SLE in very competitive markets. Thus, transparency increases market liquidity if the market is su¢ ciently competitive.
The next …gure displays the di¤erences in liquidity, DL, in terms of 2 z for di¤erent values of N: The black line corresponds to N = 10, the red one to N = 20 and the green one to N = 30: A negative value of DL indicates that the transparent market is deeper. Figure 1 illustrates that as N increases the parameter con…gurations in which the transparent market is more liquid are higher. In the limit, when N converges to in…nity, the transparent market is 2 0 To clarify the role of the strategic-behavior e¤ect, note that under perfect competition the optimal investors'demands are given by qn(p; In) = E(e vjp; In) p var(e vjp; In)!n var(e vjp; In) (see, for instance, Diamond and Verecchia (1981) ). Using these demands'expressions and the market clearing condition, it follows that the equilibrium price has only the terms associated with the adverse-selection e¤ect and the risk-bearing e¤ect. 
2 1 Formulae below can be easily derived from Expressions (7) and (8).
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where r stands for the quotient
Substituting the values of the equilibrium coe¢ cients, g( M ; r) simpli…es to
To analyze the di¤erence in price volatility,
we decompose it into two terms, DV 1 and DV 2 , with
The …rst term DV 1 shows that the di¤erence in price volatility partly stems from the di¤erence in market liquidity DL. However, the presence of a second term, DV 2 , indicates that there are other factors a¤ecting the di¤erence in price volatility. Whenever DV 2 vanishes or it is small enough, then
Then, an inverse relationship between market depth and price volatility emerges, which indicates that the mechanism with greater market price volatility provides the lower market depth. As Madhavan pointed out, a framework in which this inverse relationship arises is when priors are uninformative. To derive his result, note that Corollaries 1 and 2 imply that in this case (i.e., when 2 v converges to in…nity)
Hence, g( O ; r) = g( T ; r) (see Equation (11)) and DV 2 = 0 follows. Consequently, signDV = signDL:
Another set-up in which an inverse relationship between market depth and price volatility emerges is in large markets. Note that Moreover, after some algebra, it is easy to show that DV 1 is of the order of 1 N 2 ; but appealing to the Mean Value Theorem, lim
converges to zero faster than DV 1 and the result follows. The analytical derivation of su¢ cient conditions on the primitives that guarantee a direct relationship between price volatility and market depth is not easy. However, there are some particular cases where we can ensure that this type of relationship is feasible. For instance, if
holds, then there exists a unique value of Next …gures, Figure 4 .A and Figure 4 .B display the di¤erences in volatility in terms of 2 z for di¤erent values of N (4.A). The black line corresponds to N = 10, the red one to N = 20 and the green one to N = 30 (as N increments the parameter con…gurations in which the transparent market is less volatile becomes higher). In the limit, when N converges to in…nity, the transparent market is less volatile (and more liquid) for all Finally, all these results are summarized as follows: Proposition 5: Under improper priors there is an inverse relationship between market depth and price volatility. This result may no longer hold if priors are proper unless N is large enough.
Sunshine Trading
In this section we examine the possibility that some liquidity traders voluntarily preannounce the size of their orders to the other market participants, a practice known as sunshine trading. Thus, the timing of the game will be as follows: …rst, noise traders decide whether or not to announce their orders sizes, and second, trading takes place. We solve by backward induction and, therefore, initially we assume that the number of noise traders who preannounce is …xed. Formally, suppose that the noise demand comes from H liquidity traders, indexed by h = 1; :::; H. Thus,z = P H h=1z h ; wherez h denotes the demand for noise trader h. Letz h , h = 1; :::; H; be i.i.d. withz h N (0; Let H A represent the cardinality of this set (0 H A H) and let z A denote the realization of the aggregate demand of announcers, i.e., z A = P h2A z h : Notice that H A = 0 corresponds to a framework similar to the opaque mechanism, whereas H A = H models a setup analogous to the transparent market. 
; and
where is the unique real root belonging to 0; In what follows, in order to emphasize this fact, we will write the equilibrium coe¢ cients and 1 as (H A ) and 1 (H A ) :
We now focus on the …rst stage of the game and we study the incentives for noise traders to engage in sunshine trading. We assume that noise traders take this decision by comparing their conditional expected trading costs. Let C N A (z h ; H A ) (C A (z h ; H A )) denote the expected trading costs of a nonannouncer (an announcer), conditional on his trade size z h ; when there are H A announcers. Thus, the noise trader h is willing to preannounce his trade size whenever
Then, if (13) holds for all H A = 0; :::; H 1; and for all z h ; h = 1; :::; H, then there exists an equilibrium in which all the noise traders decide to engage in sunshine trading. Direct computations yield
Let us make some comments:
1. The conditional expected pro…ts of a noise trader are lower if he is announcer, whenever z h 6 = 0:
2. Noise traders with higher liquidity needs will be more interested in sunshine trading as long as this practice is desirable.
3. The choice of preannouncement for a noise trader is independent of his order size. This property is crucial since it implies that a noise trader who has already preannounced his order does not regret this decision when he observes that other noise traders also display their orders.
Suppose that
This inequality shows that the preannouncement has two opposite e¤ects on conditional expected trading costs. First, it reduces the price responsiveness of traders demands ( (H A + 1) < (H A )), 23 leading to higher conditional expected trading costs. Second, it facilitates that the order is partly accommodated ( 1 (H A + 1) > 0) leading to lower conditional expected trading costs. Whenever the second e¤ect dominates, the noise trader h will wish to become an announcer.
5. In the Appendix it is shown that whenever z h 6 = 0; C N A (z h ; H A ) is increasing in H A ; whereas the shape of C A (z h ; H A ) depends on the parameter con…guration.
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Whenever C A (z h ; H A ) is decreasing (and this property is satis…ed when is high enough), as
Hence, (13) holds and therefore, there is an equilibrium in which all the noise traders whose size order is not null preannounce.
It is important to point out that (14) is a su¢ cient condition for the existence of this sort of equilibrium. A weaker condition that also guarantees its existence is given by M ax Finally, the following result shows that in large markets the decision of preannouncement is unambiguous: Proposition 5: In large markets (N or H high enough), all the noise traders (whose order size is not null) decide to preannounce their order size.
The logical for this result is as follows: In large markets the action of a noise trader has a negligible impact on the economy. In particular, in this case (H A + 1) is very close to (H A ) ; making (H A + 1) (H A ) very small, so that the …rst e¤ect of preannouncement is little relevant.
26 Therefore, the second e¤ect dominates and, consequently, all the noise traders (whose order size is not null) wish to become announcers.
Conclusions
We have examined the e¤ects of disclosing information about the price-insensitive component of the order ‡ow on the market quality. Initially, we have assumed that the decision of opaqueness/transparency is taken by the exchange and, consequently, we have compared a fully opaque market with a fully transparent market. In large markets we have obtained that transparency increases liquidity and reduces price volatility, whereas in thin markets the implications of market transparency depend on parameter speci…cation. We have shown that the inverse relationship between price volatility and market liquidity obtained in Madhavan (1996) , assuming improper priors, may not hold with proper priors. The practical implication is that a change in transparency that lowers price volatility does not always reduce the execution costs of liquidity traders.
Our work might be relevant for researchers and regulators alike. From our analysis it can be argued that transparency is bene…cial for active securities, independently of the public knowledge traders initially hold on their liquidation value. For inactive securities, one market structure might turn out to be "superior"in markets with a low number of analysts or in those in which traders have little knowledge on the securities they are trading (for instance international traders who often lack of any expertise in the …nancial markets in which they operate). Otherwise, a clear ranking between transparent and opaque markets might not exist.
Finally, we have assumed that the decision to reveal the orders (prior to trading) is done voluntarily by the noise traders. We obtain that the choice of sunshine trading/dark rooms for a noise trader is independent of his order size, being the traders with higher liquidity needs more interested in sunshine trading, as long as this practice is desirable. Moreover, our analysis indicates that in large markets all the noise traders opt for sunshine trading.
Appendix
Derivation of Equations (2) and (3). Conditional on his information set, agent n chooses m n shares of the riskless asset and Q n shares of the risky asset so as to max Qn;yn E( e (vQn+mn) jp; I n ) s:t: pQ n + m n = p! n + y n ;
or, equivalently, as m n = p (! n Q n ) + y n ; to
Let q n denote the units of the risky asset traded by investor n: Thus, q n = Q n ! n : The previous optimization problem is equivalent to
Suppose that investors, other than n; use identical linear net demands given by
Then, from the market clearing condition, it follows that investor n faces a linear residual supply curve given by
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in which
Hence, investor n has to choose the quantity she trades so as to maximize her expected utility conditional on (p n ; I n ) : Furthermore, as W n jp n ; I n is normally distributed it follows that E( e Wn jp n ; I n ) = e (E(Wnjpn;In) 2 var(Wnjpn;In)) :
Her optimization problem simpli…es to
with, recall (15), E (W n jp n ; I n ) = (E (vjp n ; I n ) p n q n ) q n + E (vjp n ; I n ) ! n + y n ; and var (W n jp n ; I n ) = var (vjp n ; I n ) (q n + ! n ) 2 :
Substituting the two expressions above into the previous optimization problem and maximizing with respect to q n ; the …rst and the second order condition require respectively, that the equality and inequality stated below hold:
E (vjp n ; I n ) p n 2 q n var (vjp n ; I n ) (q n + ! n ) = 0; 2 var (p n ; I n ) < 0:
From (16) and the …rst equality, the value of q n is deduced, with
Finally, taking into account the expression of the residual supply curve, given in (16), the two (in)-equalities are equivalent to Equations (2) and (3) Proof of Lemma 1 : From the market clearing condition, it follows that the vector (p; I n ) is informatively equivalent to the vector (h n ; s n ),
so that E(e vjp; I n ) = E(e vjh n ; s n ); and var(e vjp; I n ) = var(e vjh n ; s n ): Hence,
var(e vjp; s n ) = a 2 2 " ; where
Plugging the expression for E(e vjp; I n ) obtained above into (2) , and equating coe¢ cients according to (1) , it follows that: 
From system above we obtain all coe¢ cients as functions of : To do so, we …rst derive two auxiliary equations. The …rst one is obtained after computing (1 ) = ; using (19) and (20) , and performing simple manipulations, which gives
The second one follows from rearranging (20) , and combining it with (21), resulting in
For getting we …rst divide (18) and (19) and, then, using the fact that var(e vjp; I n ) = a 2 2 " in the resulting equation, we obtain the expression given in (5): To derive the expression of ; we …rst compute var(e vjp; I n ): Substituting the values of a 1 and a 2 into (18), and using (22) in the resulting equation, we get ; and from (21), it follows that
Using the previous equality in the expression of var(e vjp; I n ); we get var(e vjp; I n ) =
: Substituting this expression in (22) and operating, the expression for given in (6) is derived. Finally, as given in (4), is obtained by dividing (17) by (20) , which gives
which combined with (22) and var(e vjp; I n ) =
and from (21), we obtain (4). Proof of Lemma 2 : From (23) and (22) we obtain From Equations (7) and (8), we have It is easy to see that
holds in this case, and consequently, prices are more informative in the transparent market. Finally, this result is also satis…ed provided that O is low enough, which is equivalent to saying that Proof of Proposition 4: From (7) and (8), it follows that 
